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NOTES
Identifying and Valuing the Injury in Lost Chance Cases

Todd S. Aagaard
Any plaintiff seeking to recover in tort must prove that the de
fendant has breached the duty of care.1 Even after the plaintiff has
established the defendant's breach of duty, however, issues of cau
sation and damages remain.2 These two issues are frequently vex
ing, both conceptually and in terms of evidentiary demonstration.
For example, if a plaintiff proves that a defendant acted negligently,
it still may be unclear whether the plaintiff would have been injured
even ip the absence of the defendant's negligence. Similarly, in as
sessing damages, factfinders often :find it difficult to attach a mone
tary value to a plaintiff's nonpecuniary losses such as pain and
suffering.
So-called "loss of chance" cases - medical-malpractice cases in
which a defend�t's negligence injures a plaintiff who has a pre
existing medical condition by reducing the plaintiff's likelihood of
recovering from the condition - pose a particularly difficult chal
lenge to courts seeking to define the scope of and place a value on a
defendant's liability.3 According to traditional tort doctrine, in
such cases the plaintiff must prove that the decreased likelihood of
recovery attributable to the defendant's negligence - as opposed
to the preexisting condition itself - more likely than not directly
caused her subsequent failure to recover.4 A person suffering from
a preexisting condition with less than a fifty-percent chance of re
covery even before diagnosis thus would have no cause of action
against a doctor who negligently failed to diagnose the condition,
even if the delay brought about by the missed diagnosis caused the
person to lose a significant chance of recovering from the condi
tion.5 For example, a person with a thirty-five percent chance of
1. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TiiE LAW OF TORTS § 53, at
356(5th ed. 1984)(defining the duty as "an obligation, to which the law will give recognition
and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another").
2. See' id. § 41, at 263 ("An essential element of the plaintiff's cause of action for negli
gence, or for that matter for any other tort, is that there be some reasonable connection
between the act or omission of the defendant and the damage which the plaintiff has
suffered.").
3. See John D. Hodson, Annotation,
54 A.L.R.411i 10, 17 (1995).

Medical Malpractice: "Loss of Chance" Causality,

4. See Cooper v. Hartman, 533 A.2d 1294, 1296-97 (Md. 1987).

5. This "loss of chance" factual scenario is typical. See, e.g., DeBurkarte v. Louvar, 393
N.W.2d 131(Iowa 1986); Delaney v. Cade, 873 P.2d 175(Kan. 1994). As noted above, the

1335

1336

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 96:1335

recovering from her cancer would, according to traditional tort doc
trine, have no cause of action against a doctor whose failure to diag
nose the cancer caused the person's chance of survival6 to fall to
twenty percent, or even to zero.
On the other hand, a person with an eighty-percent initial
chance of recovery would have a cause of action against a doctor
whose negligent misdiagnosis reduced that chance to twenty per
cent. In fact, under the traditional doctrine a plaintiff with an initial
eighty-percent chance of recovery would have a cause of action
against a doctor whose negligent misdiagnosis reduced that chance
to anything less than sixty percent if the plaintiff subsequently
failed to recover;7 in such a case, the doctor's negligence is more
likely than the preexisting condition to have caused the plaintiff's
death. The important factor is not the absolute reduction in the
plaintiff 's probability of survival, but whether the reduction that the
preexisting condition caused exceeds the reduction that the defend
ant's negligence caused. If this is the case, then the plaintiff cannot
show that the defendant's negligence most likely caused the plain
tiff's failure to recover.
Traditional tort doctrine's total denial of compensation in cases
in which a doctor's negligence has increased but has not more than
doubled8 a plaintiff 's likelihood of injury or death seems manifestly
unfair. The traditional doctrine allows such a doctor to avoid any
liability to a patient even though the doctor's failure to provide a
timely diagnosis of the patient's malady clearly deprived the patient
of an opportunity to recover from her condition. Courts and com
mentators, noting the traditional doctrine's failure to fulfill the funloss of chance doctrine was designed to address problems arising in medical malpractice
cases, and its use has been limited almost exclusively to such cases. Plaintiffs' attempts to
apply the loss of chance doctrine to analogous factual circumstances outside of the medical
malpractice context have not been successful. See David W. Robertson, The Common Sense
of Cause in Fact, 15 TEXAS L. REv. 1765, 1786 n.91 (1997) (citing Hardy v. Southwestern Bell
Tel. Co., 910 P.2d 1024 (Okla. 1996) (declining to extend application of the loss of chance
doctrine to a case involving the failure of the emergency telephone system operated by the
defendant)).
6. Although the paradigmatic lost chance case involves a lost chance of survival, the ulti
mate harm in a lost chance case is not always death. See Fennell v. Southern Md. Hosp. Ctr.,
Inc., 580 A.2d 206, 208 (Md. 1990) ("Loss of chance may include loss of chance of a positive
or more desirable medical outcome, loss of chance of avoiding some physical injury or dis
ease, or a loss of chance to survive.").
7. If the plaintiff recovers from the condition, there is no cause of action under traditional
tort law, irrespective of the magnitude of the decrease, because the plaintiff would be unable
to show damages resulting from the defendant's negligence. Cf. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 731 (5th ed. 1990) ("Proof of damages is an essential
element of the plaintiff' s case in most civil litigation.").
8. If the doctor's negligent misdiagnosis of the plaintiff's condition more than doubles the
plaintiff's likelihood of suffering injury or death, then the plaintiff may recover under the
traditional doctrine. In such a case, the doctor's negligence, rather than the preexisting con
dition itself, is the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury or death.
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damental tort goals of deterrence and compensation in these types
of lost chance cases,9 developed what is known as the loss of chance
doctrine in response.10 The loss of chance doctrine addresses the
perceived injustice of the traditional doctrine by recognizing a po
tential cause of action in any case in which the defendant's negli
gent conduct decreased the plaintiff's chance of recovery from a
preexisting condition. Thus, the loss of chance doctrine gives a
cause of action to the hypothetical plaintiff whose doctor's negli
gence decreased her likelihood of survival from thirty-five percent
to twenty percent.
Although advocates of the doctrine agree that lost chance cases
demand compensation, they disagree as to the theoretical basis for
allowing lost chance claims to proceed.11 Disagreement about the
nature of the compensable injury in a lost chance case spills over
into confusion about how to value that injury. Unfortunately, the
considerable attention that the loss of chance doctrine has gener
ated among academic commentators12 and in the courtsl3 has
9. See Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 664 P.2d 474, 486 (Wash. 1983) (Pearson, J.,
concurring) (arguing that awarding damages for the lost opportunity to recover promotes the
deterrence objective); Beth Clemens Boggs, Lost Chance of Survival Doctrine: Should the
Courts Ever Tmker with Chance?, 16 S. Iu.. U. LJ. 421, 4;40-44 (1992) (evaluating the effec
tiveness of various approaches to loss of chance cases in meeting the deterrence and compen
sation objectives); Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury
Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE LJ. 1353, 1377
(1981) (arguing that denying compensation in such cases "subverts the deterrence objectives
of tort law by denying recovery for the effects of conduct that causes statistically demonstra
ble losses").
10. Observers commonly trace the origin of the loss of chance doctrine to Professor
King's widely cited 1981 article promoting its adoption. See generally King, supra note 9. In
fact, Professor King drew many of his ideas from a 1978 article in the Personal Injury Annual
See Leon L. Wolfstone & Thomas J. Wolfstone, Recovery of Damages for the Loss of a
Chance, in PERSONAL INJURY .ANNuAL -1978, at 744 (1978). Since the landmark Washing
ton Supreme Court case of Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative, 664 P.2d 474 (Wash.
1983), the majority of courts that have considered the issue of whether to adopt the loss of
chance doctrine have decided to allow claims for a lost chance of survival. See Hodson, supra
note 3, at 34-48 (listing 24 states as having adopted the doctrine, 12 as having rejected the
doctrine, and 4 as having conflicting case law on the issue); see also Robert A. Reisig, Jr.,
Note, The Loss of a Chance Theory in Medical Malpractice Cases: An Overview, 13 AM. J.
TRIAL Aovoc. 1163, 1170 (1990) (citing cases from state courts in 20 states and federal
courts in 5 additional states in which courts adopted the doctrine). But see Bryson B. Moore,
Note, South Carolina Rejects the Lost Chance Doctrine, 48 S.C. L. REv. 201, app. A at 216-18
(1996) (classifying 16 states as having adopted some form of the doctrine and 18 as not
adopting the doctrine).
11. See infra notes 18-27 and accompanying text (discussing the "causation approach"
and "damages approach" to the doctrine).
12. See, e.g., Boggs, supra note 9; King, supra note 9; Vern R. Walker, Direct Inference in
the Lost Chance Cases: Factfinding Constraints Under Minimal Fairness to Parties, 23
HOFSTRA L. REv. 247 (1994); Moore, supra note 10.
13. Compare, e.g., Waffen v. United States Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 799 F.2d 911
(4th Cir. 1986) (holding that Maryland law recognizes a cause of action for loss of chance)
and Falcon v. Memorial Hosp., 462 N.W .2d 44 (Mich. 1990) (recognizing a loss of chance
doctrine under Michigan law) and McKellips v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467 (Okla.
1987) (recognizing a loss of chance doctrine under Oklahoma law) with, e.g., Dumas v.
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served only to perpetuate rather than alleviate this doctrinal confu
sion. These courts and commentators have focused almost exclu
sively on the issue of whether jurisdictions should adopt the lost
chance doctrine,14 while largely ignoring the equally important is
sue of how courts in jurisdictions that have adopted the doctrine
should determine the appropriate compensation in a particular
case.15 Proponents of the doctrine have proffered arguments for
why the law should compensate plaintiffs in lost chance cases with
out addressing what the compensation should be.
For example, proponents argue that denying compensation to
plaintiffs in lost chance cases would allow tortfeasors to avoid re
sponsibility for the consequences of their tortious conduct.16 With
out further elaboration as to the injury being compensated,
however, this argument begs the question it purports to answer.
That is, negligent conduct is not always tortious conduct; an act gives
rise to liability only to the extent that it causes an injury.17 Until
proponents of the loss of chance doctrine identify the injury suf
fered as a result of the negligent conduct, it is not at all clear that
the defendant has in fact "avoided" liability for her conduct, be
cause it is not clear that such conduct was tortious.
This Note seeks to define precisely the tort i.Iljury in lost chance
cases and to ascertain the proper method for measuring the dam
ages associated with that inj'!1fY. Part I defines the types of losses
that constitute the tort injury in lost chance cases and argues that
Cooney, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 584(Ct. App. 1991)(refusing to recognize a loss of chance doctrine
under California law) and Gooding v. University Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015 (Fla.
1984)(refusing to recognize a loss of chance doctrine under Florida law).

14. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 9, 12, & 13.
15. See Smith v.State Dept. of Health & Hosps., 676 So. 2d 543, 547 n.8 (La. 1996)
("While the loss of a chance of survival doctrine has spawned a plethora of commentary and
has been recognized by a majority of the states, little attention has been given to the complex
issue we focus on today of the appropriate methodology for calculating the value of the loss
of a chance of survival."(citations omitted)); Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO.WASH.L.
REv. 136, 173 (1992) ("Many of the courts that presently do allow [recovery for loss of
chance] are vague or silent about the nature of the value that is lost, and simply rely on prior
precedents as justification. ").
In a sense, this Note inverts the standard analysis of the loss of chance doctrine by identi
fying the cognizable injury in lost chance cases and determining how it should be compen
sated without first inquiring whether it should be compensated. This Note does not address
directly the latter question of whether courts should adopt the loss of chance doctrine. Yet
insofar as it demonstrates that the compensable injury in a lost chance case is cognizable
under the same principles of causation as are employed in a traditional tort case, see infra
section I.A, this Note's analysis arguably obviates the need to justify further the compensa
tion of lost chance claims. Cf. 1 DAN B. DoBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 1.7, at 28(2d ed. 1993)
("The [traditional] scheme of analysis ... works when we have a clear conception of the
plaintiff's right and want to know what the remedy is. Sometimes, however, the process is
reversed and we know what the right is only because we see it exemplified in the remedy.").

16. See Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 664 P.2d 474, 477(Wash. 1983); Wolfstone &
supra note 10, at 762.
17. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.

Wolfstone,
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courts have, for the most part, failed to identify these losses prop
erly. For this reason, they have failed to measure damages in a way
that accurately compensates for these losses. Part II advocates a
method of damages determination that relies on direct assessment
of the tort injury by the factfinder, informed by a clear understand
ing of the distinct tort injury at issue and by the guidance tradition
ally offered by the judge's instructions, In advancing such a
formulation, Part II criticizes two alternative methods of damage
valuation. This Note concludes that the loss of chance doctrine can
achieve legitimacy as a valid extension - rather than an ill-fitting
alteration - of traditional principles of tort law only by defining in
precise terms the losses that constitute the tort injury in lost ch�ce
cases and by allowing juries the discretion to assess the value of
those losses without undue constraints.
I.

CONCEPTUALIZING THE TORT INJURY IN
LOST CHANCE CASES

Neither judges nor juries can accurately measure damages in
lost chance cases without an adequate conceptualization of the pre
cise nature of the injury they are compensating. A judge must have
a clear vision of the nature of the injury so that she can rule on
evidentiary matters, properly instruct the jury in its deliberations,
and subsequently evaluate the validity of the jury's verdict. A jury
must understand thoroughly the nature of the injury if it is to deter
mine accurately whether the injury has occurred and, if it finds that
such injury has occurred, to measure accurately the loss that the
plaintiff has suffered.
This Part conceptualizes the harrp. suffered in a lost chance case
in order to enable the development of a framework for measuring
the damages associated with such harm. Section I.A addresses the
antecedent issue of distinguishing the compensable losses from the
noncompensable losses - an area of particular confusion to courts
and commentators. It concludes that the plaintiff's tort "injury" in
a lost chance case is actually an amalgamation of losses, all directly
related to the plaintiff's deprivation of an opportunity for a better
result. Section I.B identifies the types of compensable losses that
arise in lost chance cases and describes the case-specific, fact
intensive inquiry necessary to identify, first, which of these losses
are present and, second, which of the losses that are present have
occurred as a consequence of the defendant's negligent conduct which of these harms make up the tort injury in a given case.
A.

Distinguishing the Tort Injury from the Underlying Injury

The coexistence of multiple injuries - some of which the de
fendant's negligence proximately caused and some of which are at-
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tributable to the preexisting condition - makes identification of
the lost chance tort injury particularly difficult. The fact that courts
have adopted two competing premises for compensating lost chance
plaintiffs - the causation approach and the damages approach further confuses this task, because a court's rationale for compen
sating lost chance plaintiffs affects how it conceptualizes the plain
tiff's tort injury. This section argues that the damages approach
properly focuses on those portions of the plaintiff's losses that the
defendant's negligence proximately caused. It then distinguishes
these losses from the losses resulting from the underlying condition
and asserts that only the former constitute the compensable tort
injury in lost chance cases.
The loss of chance doctrine represents a departure from tradi
tional tort doctrine.18 There has been considerable dispute, how
ever, as to the precise nature and extent of this departure. Because
the loss of chance doctrine allows a legal claim in cases in which the
plaintiff cannot prove that the defendant more likely than not
caused the plaintiff's ultimate failure to recover, some courts and
commentators conceptualize the doctrine as an exception to the
"basic rule of legal cause," which holds that "[a] negligent actor is
legally responsible for that harm, and only that harm, of which his
negligence is a cause in fact."19 Courts employing this causation
approach20 to the loss of chance doctrine award compensation to
lost chance plaintiffs on the ground that the lost chance factual sce
nario necessitates a relaxation of the traditional requirement of
proximate causation.21 In other words, adherents of the causation
approach sacrifice tort law's usual means of establishing liability the demonstration of a clear causal nexus between negligent act and
harmful result - in order to vindicate fairness values.22

An alternative approach to the doctrine, the damages ap
proach,23 conceives of the loss of chance doctrine differently, and in
doing so avoids the need to carve out an exception from the tradi
tional causation standard. According to the damages approach, the
loss of chance cause of action does not depend on a relaxation of
18. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text
19. RoBERT E. KEEToN, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF ToRTS 4 {1963) (emphasis
omitted).
20. See Cooper v. Hartman, 533 A.2d 1294, 1297 (Md. 1987).
21. See Robert S. Bruer, Note, Loss of a Chance as a Cause of Action in Medical Mal
practice Cases: Wollen v. DePaul Health Center, 59 Mo . L. REv. 969, 983 (1994); Reisig,
supra note 10, at 1171.
22. In awarding compensation for the plaintiff's entire loss, the causation approach suc
cessfully avoids the difficult issues involved in valuing the tort injury -but only by over
extending the scope of the defendant's liability to reach losses that the defendant's
negligence did not cause. See infra text accompanying notes 71-74 (criticizing the practice of
awarding full damages in loss of chance cases).
23. See Hartman, 533 A.2d at 1297.
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the causation standard, but on a clarification of the injury for which
the plaintiff seeks compensation.24 Courts adopting tlris approach
hold that the plaintiff may sue only for the harms specifically attrib
utable to her lost chance of recovering from the condition, and not
for the harms that were as likely, or more likely, caused by the con
dition itself.25 This separate cognizable injury is distinct from the
plaintiff's ultimate failure to recover,26 for which the preexisting
condition is by definition the legal cause in a case involving the loss
of chance doctrine.21
Lost chance cases thus involve two injuries:28 the underlying in
jury29 caused by the preexisting condition and the tort injury caused
by the loss of a chance to recover from the preexisting condition.30
The coexistence of these two distinct, yet closely related, injuries
exacerbates the difficulty of the court's task beyond that of the typi
cal negligence case. Courts in these cases must distinguish carefully
the losses associated with the tort injury from the losses associated
with the plaintiff's underlying injury.31 This distinction, however,
eludes many courts.32
24.

See 533 A.2d at 1297.
See 533 A.2d at 1297.
26. See Reisig, supra note 10, at 1170-71.
27. See Falcon v. Memorial Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44, 52 (Mich. 1990); Herskovits v. Group
Health Coop., 664 P.2d 474, 481 (Wash. 1983) (Pearson, J., concurring).
25.

28. The underlying injury is always present in cases to which the loss of chance doctrine
applies; the plaintiff alleges, but may or may not be able to prove in a particular case, also to
have suffered the tort injury.
29. In addition to the ultimate harm, see infra text accompanying note 33, of which the
preexisting condition is the clear but-for cause, the underlying injury consists of a set of
physical, emotional, and consequential damages separate from those caused by the loss of
chance, cf. infra note 43 (discussing the physical, emotional, and consequential losses associ
ated with the lost chance). The set of injuries that the preexisting condition caused are not
compensable, while the set of injuries that the loss of chance caused are compensable.
30. Al; noted above, although the loss of chance potentially also bears some causal rela
tion to the plaintiff's ultimate failure to recover, by definition, the lost chance is not a but-for
a more-likely-than-not - cause of her failure to recover; otherwise, the case would be a
straightforward tort claim. Even so, most courts identify the tort injury in terms of its poten
tial relationship to the failure to recover. See, e.g., infra note 76 (criticizing the proportional
valuation method of damages assessment as making such a mistake). Al; the balance of this
section argues, that nebulous relationship need not and should not be the basis for compensa
tion in a lost chance case. Rather, courts should compensate lost chance plaintiffs for a loss
solely on the same basis as in any other tort case - the plaintiff's ability to demonstrate, first,
that the plaintiff has suffered the loss and, second, that the defendant's negligence proxi
mately caused the Joss.

-

31. See Delaney v. Cade, 873 P.2d 175, 186 (Kan. 1994) ("[T]he damages recoverable [in
a lost chance case] should be limited to the amount attributable to the lost or reduced chance
itself and not the total damages, which would include those resulting from the preexisting
condition."); see also Levit, supra note 15, at 155 (observing that the central premise of the
Joss of chance doctrine is that "[c]ourts permit plaintiffs to sue for the lost possibility of
improvement, rather than for the defendant's contribution to or enhancement of the plain
tiff's illness or injury").
32. For example, some courts award plaintiffs in lost chance cases the full value of the
losses that both injuries caused, rather than limiting the damages award to the loss that the
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Just as with any other tort case, the tort injury in a lost chance
case is the set of harms for which the plaintiff can show that the
defendant's negligence was a but-for cause. This injury does not
include compensating for the possibility that the defendant's negli
gence caused the ultimate harm - usually, but not always, death33
- resulting from the plaintiff's failure to recover. The fact that
both the preexisting condition and the lost chance of recovery may
have contributed to a plaintiff's failure to recover does not logically
entail that the underlying injury and the tort injury are indistin
guishable. The fact that multiple potential causes - including the
defendant's negligence - may exist for those harms associated with
the underlying injury does not mean that the usual, straightforward,
"more likely than not" test for causation should not apply. Neither
does it provide an excuse for courts to aggregate all the plaintiff's
harms and apportion liability based on some overall percentage
likelihood of causation.34
Many courts obscure the distinction between the tort injury and
the ultimate harm by requiring that the plaintiff must actually have
suffered the ultimate harm before seeking damages for the loss of
the chance of recovery.35 These courts worry that if the tort injury
is truly distinct from the underlying injury, then no principled basis
appears to exist for limiting liability to those cases in which the pre
existing condition develops into physical loss; the chance has been
lost regardless of whether the plaintiff recovers from the preexisting
condition. In the course of an opinion declining to adopt the loss of
chance doctrine, the Maryland Court of Appeals noted this prob
lem: "If courts are going to allow damages solely for the loss of
chance of survival, logically there ought to be recovery for loss of
chance regardless of whether the patient succumbs to the unrelated
pre-existing medical problem or miraculously recovers despite the
lost probability of recovery caused. See, e.g., Thompson v. Sun City Community Hosp. , 688
P.2d 605, 615-16 (Ariz. 1984); Kallenberg v. Beth Israel Hosp. , 357 N.Y.S.2d 508, 510-11
(App. Div. 1974), affd., 374 N.Y.S.2d 615 (1975); see also infra text accompanying notes 71-74
(criticizing this approach). The causation approach to the loss of chance doctrine perpetuates
this problem by framing the loss of chance simply as an exception to conventional principles
of causation. The damages approach, on the other hand, properly distinguishes between the
tort injury and the underlying injury. See supra notes 18-27 and accompanying text (discuss
ing the causation and damages approaches). This Note therefore advocates the damages
approach.
Even among those courts that purport to recognize the distinction between the tort injury
and the underlying injury, many that apply the proportional valuation method do so in a way
that exhibits a failure to discriminate adequately between the two injuries. See infra text
accompanying notes 75-79.
33. See supra note 6 (noting the possibility of ultimate harms other than death).
34. Cf. infra section Il.A (criticizing the proportional valuation method of assessing dam
ages in lost chance cases for taking such an approach).
35. See Fennell v. Southern Md. Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 580 A.2d 206, 213 (Md. 1990) ("Loss of
chance of survival in itself is not compensable unless and until death ensues.").
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negligence and unfavorable odds."36 Based on this perceived fun
damental weakness in the doctrine -its apparent application even
in cases in which the plaintiff experiences no ultimate harm -these
courts deny any compensation in lost chance cases.
In doing so, these courts commit precisely the conceptual error
noted above. They fail to recognize that the reduced probability of
recovering from the preexisting condition - the lost chance itself
-is not the tort injury. Rather, the tort injury in a lost chance case
is the set of harms that proximately result from the loss of the
chance. The lost chance plaintiff's claim to damages for a tort in
jury therefore is contingent not just on her lost chance of survival
but also on her ability to show damages resulting from the loss of
the chance.37 The plaintiff's ability to show damages will hinge on
the occurrence of the ultimate harm - her ultimate recovery or
failure to recover from the preexisting condition - only to the ex
tent, if any, that it reflects the existence or nonexistence of these
losses.

If the plaintiff has suffered no ultimate harm, the claim is not a
claim under the lost chance doctrine but a typical medical malprac
tice claim. For example, a plaintiff may well recover from the pre
existing condition but require additional medical care, or
experience additional pain due to her doctor's negligently delayed
diagnosis. Such a plaintiff has suffered no ultimate harm but clearly
has suffered a tort injury. Indeed, this tort injury resembles the in
jury in a conventional medical malpractice case.
Yet, an opponent might argue, if the lost chance doctrine does
limit liability to cases in which the mere likelihood that the
plaintiff will fail to recover develops into an actual failure to re
cover, then the doctrine threatens to become indistinguishable from
a claim for compensation for an as-yet unmanifested injury. Courts
have looked upon such risk-based compensation claims with consid
erably less favor than the loss of chance doctrine.38 They have re
fused to recognize a cause of action for increased risk primarily on
the ground that the law can best compensate plaintiffs facing possi
ble future harm by waiting to see if the harm materializes and then
allowing the plaintiff to bring a claim if and when the harm does

not

36. Fennel� 580 A.2d at 213.
37. Cf. infra section I.B (describing the physical, emotional, and consequential losses that
the lost chance can cause).
38. See 2 DOBBS, supra note 15, § 8.1(7), at 410 (noting that courts usually have denied
compensation to plaintiffs pursuing claims for enhanced risk); Terry Morehead Dworkin,
Fear of Disease and Delayed Manifestation Injuries: A Solution or a Pandora's Box?, 53
FORDHAM L. RE.v. 527, 527 (1984) (same); Fournier J. Gale m & James L. Goyer m, Recov
ery for Cancerphobia and Increased Risk of Cancer, 15 CuMB. L. RE.v. 723, 736-41 (1985)
(same). Unlike the increased-risk claim, which looks to the possibility of future injury, the
loss of chance claim is based entirely on an injury that has already occurred.
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materialize.39 No such future cause of action, however, is available
to the plaintiff asserting a loss of chance claim. The loss of chance
doctrine does not enable a plaintiff to sue based on the chance of
incurring a future ultimate harm; she will not have a cause of action
based on the ultimate harm even after it occurs. Unlike the
increased-risk claim, which seeks compensation for the possibility
that an as-yet unmanifested injury will occur in the future, the harm
in a lost chance case already has materialized; all the losses that the
lost chance plaintiff will suffer either have occurred or will occur by
the time the case comes before a court.40

In sum, every loss of chance case involves a defendant whose
negligent behavior increased the likelihood that a plaintiff suffering
from some preexisting condition would fail to recover from the con
dition - that is, would suffer some ultimate harm. The loss of
chance doctrine applies to those cases in which the plaintiff suffers
the ultimate harm but cannot show that the defendant's negligence
- as opposed to the preexisting condition - was the proximate
cause of the ultimate harm. The ultimate harm is therefore ancil
lary to the plaintiff's claim for compensation. But whether or not
the plaintiff has suffered the ultimate harm, the defendant's negli
gence may have caused other losses for the plaintiff. It is these
losses, for which the plaintiff can demonstrate that the defendant's
negligence was the proximate cause, that form the tort injury.
B.

Identifying the Consequences of the Defendant's Negligence

A defendant doctor whose negligent misdiagnosis deprives a
plaintiff of a chance to recover from a preexisting condition poten
tially has caused several different types of compensable harms. Five
categories of harm potentially occur in a lost chance case: the ulti
mate harm, the lost chance of survival itself, increased physical pain
and other physical losses,41 emotional losses, and consequential
damages such as additional medical costs.42 A prevailing plaintiff in
a case invoking the lost chance doctrine by definition has suffered
from the first two types of injury - the ultimate harm and the lost
chance - but neither of these injuries is compensable.43 Some
39. See 2 DoBBs, supra note 15, § 8.1(7), at 410.
See id.
41. For example, a doctor's failure to diagnose or

40.

treat a patient's breast cancer in a
timely manner may result in progression of the cancer to the point where a mastectomy
rather than radiation therapy is needed to treat the cancer.
42. See Allen E. Shoenberger, Medical Malpractice Injury: Causation and Valuation of
the Loss of a Chance to Survive, 6 J. LEGAL MEo. 51, 69 (1985).
43. As previously discussed, the ultimate harm is not compensable under a loss of chance
claim. See supra section I.A. This Note takes the position that the lost chance also is not
compensable in and of itself; courts should compensate only the identifiable loss to the plain
tiff caused by the lost chance, rather than the lost chance itself. Cf. Werner v. Blankfort, 42
Cal. Rptr. 2d 229, 234-36 (Ct. App. 1995) (distinguishing between lost chance cases that do
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combination of the remaining three categories of losses forms the
tort injury in a particular lost chance case.
At its core, the task of identifying the tort injury in a lost chance
case therefore involves determining, first, which of these types of
loss the plaintiff has suffered and, second, which of these demon
strated losses the defendant's negligence proximately caused. This
requires a highly case-specific and fact-intensive inquiry.44 The
opinions in two cases, James v. United States4s and Evers v.
Dollinger,46 illustrate quite effectively the three categories of loss
suffered in typical lost chance cases - physical, emotional, and con
sequential - and how these losses are distinct from the underlying
injury. James and Evers exemplify the careful analysis that courts
applying the lost chance doctrine must adopt; they stand in marked
contrast to the muddled and truncated analyses that dominate most
judicial examinations of tort injury.47 The two cases involved very
similar factual scenarios. The plaintiffs, William James and Merle
Evers, both received medical examinations from doctors who negli
gently failed to discover cancerous tumors developing inside their
bodies, thus delaying medical treatment to treat the tumors.48
not seek direct compensation for the lost chance of recovery, which are cognizable under
"established principles of causation," and those that seek direct compensation for the lost
chance). These losses will fall into one of the three remaining categories of injury - physi
cal, emotional, or consequential.

44. See Shoenberger, supra note 42, at 69 (asserting that proper analysis of a lost chance
case requires "finer discrimination with respect to causation, allowing close examination of
the question, 'causation of what?' "). Although any tort case involves a case-specific inquiry
into the facts of the case, the need for such an inquiry is particularly acute in the lost chance
context, in which the coexistence of, and close relationship between, the compensable tort
injury and the preexisting condition exacerbate the difficulty of the factfinder's causation
inquiry.
45. 483 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
46. 471 A.2d 405 (NJ. 1984).
47. See, e.g., Mays v. United States, 608 F. Supp. 1476, 1482-83 (D. Colo. 1985) (applying,
without explanation, the proportional valuation method to the net pecuniary losses suffered
by the plaintiff but not to damages arising out of loss of consortium, although both similarly
arose out of the death of plaintiff's decedent); Polischeck v. United States, 535 F. Supp. 1261,
1266 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (applying proportional valuation to adjust the life expectancy, rather
than to determine the overall damages - much less the particular damages resulting from
the loss of chance - of the plaintiff's decedent); Gordon v. Willis Knighton Med. Ctr., 661
So. 2d 991, 1000-01 (La. Ct App. 1995) (applying the loss of chance doctrine even after
noting that the evidence established that the defendant's negligence more likely than not
killed the plaintiff's decedent).
48. The federal district court in James applied California law to a Federal Tort Claims Act
action arising out of a negligently delayed cancer diagnosis. Due to a clerical error, the pre
employment physical examination of James, a naval shipyard worker, failed to identify that
James was suffering from lung cancer. Approximately two years later, after James began
experiencing chest pains, shortness of breath, and coughing, his personal physician discov
ered the tumor in his lung. By this time, however, the tumor had become inoperable. After
radiation therapy, James's cancer went into remission. See 483 F. Supp. at 583. According to
James's experts, the government's negligent failure to diagnose his lung cancer resulted in a
10-15% reduction in his probability of surviving five years. See 483 F. Supp. at 585. It ap-

1346

Michigan Law Review

[Vol.

96:1335

Both James and Evers claimed physical losses as components of
their lost chance injuries. The James court conceptualized James's
physical loss as "the loss of the opportunity for earlier and possibly
more effective treatment."49 The Evers court similarly described
the physical aspect of Evers's tort injury, which involved the exacer
bation of her cancer due to Dr. Dollinger's failure to diagnose and
commence treatment: "As a proximate result of [the defendant's
negligence], the tumor not only remained in her body, it grew in
size. Plaintiff was unquestionably more seriously diseased as a re
sult of the growth of the malignancy."50 Both courts thus correctly
limited the plaintiff's compensation for physical loss to the physical
harm that the exacerbation of the preexisting condition caused
rather than the physical harm that the preexisting condition itself
caused.
James and Evers also both claimed that their delayed diagnoses
caused them emotional pain and suffering. The James court de
scribed "the mental anguish from the awareness of th[e] lost oppor
tunity," the damages for which were to be offset by "the
psychological benefit from not having known of his cancer [for the
two years prior to the delayed diagnosis]."51 The Evers court noted
the "anxiety, emotional anguish and mental distress"52 caused by
the defendant's negligent failure to diagnose Evers's cancer and
found that "[d]amages for Mrs. Evers'[s] emotional and mental suf
fering should be awarded upon proof that this distress resulted from
defendant's negligent failure to diagnose her tumor and effectuate
prompt and proper treatment."53 As the Evers court was careful to
note, the mental suffering caused by the preexisting condition which was not compensable and not part of the tort injury - must
be distinguished from the mental suffering caused specifically by
the plaintiff's knowledge "that defendant's delay in her treatment

pears from the opinion that James's cancer had become conclusively terminal at the time the
court decided the case.

Evers arose out of the delayed diagnosis of Evers's breast cancer. Evers had visited the
defendant, Dr. Kenneth Dollinger, after feeling a small lump in her breast. Dollinger assured
Evers that the lump was not of concern. See 471 A.2d at 407. After noticing that the lump
was increasing in size and growing increasingly painful, Evers again visited Dr. Dollinger's
office but again was told that the lump was not cancerous. See 471 A.2d at 407. Unsatisfied
with the diagnosis, Evers consulted another doctor, who diagnosed her breast cancer and
performed a mastectomy. See 471 A.2d at 407. Evers's cancer was subsequently found to
have spread to her lungs and become terminal. See 471 A.2d at 407-08.
49. James, 483 F. Supp. at 587.
50.

Evers,

471 A.2d at 410 (footnotes omitted).

51. James, 483 F. Supp. at 587-88.
52.

Evers,

471 A.2d at 410.

53.

Eyers,

471 A.2d at 411.
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had increased the risk that she would again fall victim, perhaps fa
tally, to the disease," which was compensable.s4
With respect to the third type of loss, consequential harm, Evers
was more successful in obtaining damages than was James. Evers
alleged that the defendant's negligently delayed diagnosis had re
sulted in additional medical costs.ss In analyzing Evers's claim, the
Evers court was careful to exclude the medical costs that would
have occurred even in the absence of Dr. Dollinger's negligence,
noting that Evers had not claimed "that absent the seven months
delay in diagnosis the mastectomy would not have been re
quired."S6 Because Evers's cancer would have required a mastec
tomy even if the defendant had not failed to diagnose it during his
examinations of Evers, Evers had no claim for the medical expenses
or physical pain and suffering resulting from the mastectomy.
James, on the other hand, did not claim additional medical ex
penses, but he did ask for other consequential damages. The James
court, however, properly refused to award James damages for lost
earnings from his employment or to award his wife damages for loss
of support and loss of consortium, as it found that the underlying
cancer, rather than the exacerbation of James's condition due to the
government's delayed diagnosis, caused those elements of the
James' loss.s7

In sum, the losses that comprise the tort injury in a lost chance
case fall into three broad categories: physical, emotional, and con
sequential. Identifying the tort injury requires the factfinder not
only to ascertain what losses the plaintiff has suffered, but also to
exclude carefully the losses associated with the underlying injury
rather than the tort injury. As James and Evers demonstrate, the
lost chance tort injury may involve different sets of losses even in
similar cases. Identification of the tort injury thus necessitates care
ful case-by-case analysis.
II.

VALUING DAMAGES TO COMPENSATE
CHANCE TORT INJURY

THE

LOST

Identification of the tort injury is a necessary, but not sufficient,
step in the process of clarifying the loss of chance doctrine's appli
cation; the doctrine must also articulate a method for translating
the identified injury into monetary damages. Professor King de
fined valuation as "the process of identifying and measuring the loss
54. Evers, 471 A.2d at 409. Not surprisingly, Evers testified at trial that she carried "anger and hostility towards defendant after her tumor was finally diagnosed." 471 A.2d at 411.
55.
56.

See Evers, 471 A.2d at 408.
Evers, 471 A.2d at 408.
See James v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 581, 588 (N.D. Cal. 1980).

57.
articulate the basis for this finding.

The court did not
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that was cause& by the tortious conduct."58 Nonpecuniary losses
such as those involved in a loss of chance injury are notoriously
difficult to measure.59 Furthermore, because the loss suffered in a
lost chance case is conceptually more complex than the standard
tort injury, "[t]he acceptance of the loss of a chance theory raises
unique issues in the area of damage recovery."60 To state what may
- or should - be obvious, the key criterion in choosing a method
of valuing the tort injury must be the degree to which the result
obtained by applying the valuation method corresponds with the
actual loss caused by the injury to be compensated.61
Courts have followed three distinct approaches to valuing dam
ages in lost chance cases.62 The discretionary valuation method
gives the factfinder discretion to assess damages based on its evalu
ation of all the relevant evidence. 63 Courts applying discretionary
58. King, supra note 9, at 1354.
59. See Mark Geistfeld, Placing a Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping
Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries, 83 CAL. L. REv. 773, 778-79 (1995)
("The problem is that there is no obvious relationship between money and a nonmonetary
injury. Consequently, different ways of conceptualizing how these damages should be deter·
mined could yield significantly different damages awards.").
60. Reisig, supra note 10, at 1182.
The persistence of the fundamentally flawed causation approach to the doctrine, see supra
notes 18-27 and accompanying text, further increases the difficulty of correctly valuing the
tort injury in lost chance cases. Kallenberg v. Beth Israel Hospital, 357 N.Y.S.2d 508, 510-11
(App. Div. 1974), affd., 374 N.Y.S.2d 615 (1975), aptly illustrates how a court's conceptualiza·
tion of the tort injury can affect how it decides to value the plaintiff's loss. In Kallenberg, the
defendant hospital's staff negligently failed to administer a drug needed to reduce the plain·
tiff's blood pressure that would have allowed her to be operated upon for a cerebral aneu
rysm. See 357 N.Y.S.2d at 509. According to the plaintiff's expert, had the defendants
administered the medication to Kallenberg and subsequently operated upon her, she would
have had a 20-40% chance of survival. See 357 N.Y.S.2d at 510. Adopting the causation
approach, the court held that the lost chance of survival was sufficient to allow the jury to
find that the hospital's negligence had caused Kallenberg's death. See 357 N.Y.S.2d at 511.
The Kallenberg court conceptualized Kallenberg's lost chance of survival as an issue of proof
of proximate causation in a wrongful death action, rather than as an injury distinct from her
death. Because Kallenberg had only a 20-40% chance of survival even in the absence of the
defendant hospital's negligence, the hospital's negligence was not a but-for cause of
Kallenberg's death, and the hospital therefore should not have been held liable for a full
wrongful death award. In awarding damages to compensate for Kallenberg's ultimate harm,
the court violated the fundamental principle of causation in tort law by extending the defend·
ant's liability beyond the injury resulting from its negligence. See supra note 19 and accom
panying text. As a result, the court upheld the jury's damages award for the full value of
Kallenberg's ultimate harm - in this case, her death.
61. Judge McAuliffe of the Maryland Court of Appeals, concurring in Fennell v. Southern
Maryland Hospital Center, Inc., 580 A.2d 206, 216 (Md. 1990) (McAuliffe, J., concurring),
cogently identified the objective of the process of evaluating damages in lost chance cases:
"[R]ecovery should be based on recognition that deprivation of a substantial chance of sur·
viva! is, in itself, a loss that can be valued and compensated. The damages that should be
allowed ought to, as closely as possible, match the value of what has been lost."
62. See Borgren v. United States, 723 F. Supp. 581, 582 (D. Kan. 1989); Boody v. United
States, 706 F. Supp. 1458, 1465 (D. Kan. 1989); DeBurkarte v. Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131, 137
(Iowa 1986); King, supra note 9, at 1381-82.
63. See, e.g., Borgren, 723 F. Supp. at 582; James v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 581, 586
(N.D. Cal. 1980); DeBurkarte, 393 N.W.2d at 137. In a recent opinion in which it adopted the
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valuation guide the factfinder's inquiry with instructions that iden
tify the nature of the tort injury in a lost chance case and that em
phasize the proof of causation required for each loss for which the
plaintiff is to be compensated.64 Proportional valuation, the
method that the majority of courts have adopted, values lost chance
damages by multiplying the percentage reduction in the chance of
recovery by the total value of the loss the plaintiff suffered - the
tort injury and the underlying injury combined.65 Proportional val
uation thus limits the fact:finder's role in valuing damages to deter
mining the percentage reduction in the plaintiff's chance of
recovery and the value of the plaintiff's total loss. The full damages
approach awards damages to lost chance plaintiffs for all of their
losses, whether caused by the preexisting condition or by the lost
chance, and without regard to the magnitude of the reduction in
probability of recovery that the defendant's negligence caused.66
This Part argues that the discretionary valuation method is the
most accurate and precise of these three approaches in assessing the

discretionary method, the Louisiana Supreme Court described the nature of the inquiry to be
undertaken by a factfinder applying discretionary valuation:
Evidence of loss of support, loss of love and affection and other wrongful death damages
is relevant, but not mathematically determinative, in loss of a chance of survival cases, as
is evidence of the percentage chance of survival at the time of the malpractice. The
plaintiff may also present evidence of, and argue, other factors to the jury, such as that a
ten percent chance of survival may be more significant when reduced from ten percent
to zero than when reduced from forty to thirty percent. The jury may also consider such
factors as that the victim, although not likely to survive, would have lived longer but for
the malpractice.
Smith v. State Dept. of Health & Hosps., 676 So. 2d 543, 549 n.10 (La. 1996).
64. Effective jury instructions implementing the discretionary valuation approach there
fore should instruct the jury to award damages only for those physical, emotional, and conse
quential losses that the plaintiff has shown to have proximately resulted from the defendant's
negligently delayed diagnosis. The instructions should remind the jury carefully to segregate
the underlying and tort injuries and to deny compensation for any losses that the plaintiff's
preexisting condition, rather than the defendant's negligence, caused.
65. See, e.g., Delaney v. Cade, 873 P.2d 175, 187 (Kan. 1994); Falcon v. Memorial Hosp.,
462 N.W.2d 44, 52-57 (Mich. 1990); McKellips v. Saint Francis Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467, 47677 {Okla. 1987); see also Reisig, supra note 10, at 1184. The proportional valuation method is
also known as the "pure chance" or "percentage apportionment" method. See Boody, 106 F.
Supp. at 1465.
In a passage that courts have quoted widely, see, e.g., Borkowski v. Sacheti, 682 A.2d
1095, 1101 {Conn. App. Ct. 1996); Smith, 616 So. 2d at 551; Kramer v. Lewisville Meml.
Hosp., 858 S.W.2d 397, 402 {Tex. 1993), Professor King described the application of his pro
portional valuation approach in a hypothetical case:
[C]onsider a patient who suffers a heart attack and dies as a result. Assume that the
defendant-physician negligently misdiagnosed the patient's condition, but that the pa
tient would have had only a 40% chance of survival even with a timely diagnosis and
proper care
Under the [proportional valuation method], the plaintiff's compensation
for the loss of the victim's chance of surviving the heart attack would be 40% of the
compensable value of the victim's life had he survived . . . .
King, supra note 9, at 1382.
66. See Thompson v. Sun City Community Hosp., 688 P.2d 605, 615-16 (Ariz. 1984) (en
bane); Kallenberg v. Beth Israel Hosp., 357 N.Y.S.2d 508, 510-11 {App. Div. 1974), affd., 374
N.Y.S.2d 615 {1975).
• . . .
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lost chance tort injury. Section II.A contends that discretionary val
uation allows factfinders to tailor the damages award to the actual
losses arising out of the tort injury and that the proportional valua
tion and full damages methods do not. Section II.B highlights other
strengths of the discretionary method and shows how it avoids the
problems that arise under other methods.
A.

Conceptual Nexus to the Tort Injury

As the purpose of valuation is to "measur[e] the loss that was
caused by the tortious conduct,"67 the most important attribute of a
method of valuing damages is the degree to which it correctly re
flects the value of the plaintiff's compensable harm. Because courts
and commentators have failed to analyze carefully the nature of the
compensable harm in a lost chance case,68 they also have not as
sessed the degree to which each of the three valuation methods re
flects the value of the lost chance plaintiff's compensable harm.
This section applies the framework developed in Part I to analyze
the degree to which the damages calculations of the discretionary
valuation, full damages, and proportional valuation methods reflect
a lost chance plaintiff's compensable harms.
The discretionary valuation method, if implemented with care
fully worded jury instructions, carries the best chance for accurately
valuing the plaintiff's tort injury. The inherent flexibility of discre
tionary valuation, coupled with its focus on causation, allows the
jury to consider all relevant evidence and make specific findings
with respect to each element of damages for which the plaintiff
claims a right to compensation. Guided by instructions that high
light the distinction between the lost chance tort injury and the un
derlying injury,69 the factfinder can isolate those losses that the
defendant's negligence caused and compensate the plaintiff for
67. King, supra note 9, at 1354.
68. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
69. Although many observers have questioned the effectiveness of pattern jury instruc
tions in guiding juries, see, e.g., AMlRAM ELWORK ET AL., MAKING JURY INsrnucnoNs UN
DERSTANDABLE 1-24 (1982) (reviewing "empirical evidence which demonstrates that many of
the jury instructions that are presently used around the country are incomprehensible to the
average juror"), research suggests that carefully worded instructions can increase signifi
cantly juries' comprehension of instructions, see, e.g., id. at 71 (asserting that "in most in
stances [instructions developed using the authors' method] should ensure that jurors have a
sufficient comprehension of the laws they are supposed to apply"); Jamison Wilcox, The Craft

of Drafting Plain-Language Jury Instructions: A Study of a Sample Pattern Instruction on
Obscenity, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 1159, 1162 (1986) (contending that "recent advances can aid the

average lawyer or judge to draft and evaluate jury instructions with successful attention to
jurors' ability to understand them"). More important for the purposes of this Note, recent
empirical evidence "offer[s] a significant challenge to the argument that legal professionals
are more capable and consistent than juries in awarding noneconomic damages." Neil
Vidmar & Jeffrey J. Rice, Assessments of Noneconomic Damage Awards in Medical Negli

gence: A Comparison ofJurors with Legal Professionals, 78 lowA L. REv. 883, 901 (1993).
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them. Although the factfinder's discretionary valuation only esti
mates the value of the tort injury rather than establishing or guar
anteeing a particular "correct" result, this is true of any damages
calculation in any tort case.70 Thus, because the discretionary
method mandates a case-specific inquiry, the resulting valuation
likely will more closely approximate the plaintiff's actual losses than
either the full damages or proportional valuation methods.
By contrast, the compensation awarded under the full damages
approach does not correspond to the value of the lost chance plain
tiff's tort injury - and the absence of any nexus is fatal to the ap
proach's viability as a legitimate measure of damages in a lost
chance case. Courts that award the prevailing plaintiff in a lost
chance case the full value of all of the plaintiff' s losses blatantly
disregard the distinction between the tort injury and the ultimate
harm.71 Awarding plaintiffs the full value of all of their losses is
"too onerous for defendants . . . [who] should not have to compen
sate a plaintiff for the percentage of the harm they did not cause or
that would have occurred naturally."72 Furthermore, " [t]o allow
full recovery would ignore the claimants' inability to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the malpractice victim would
have survived but for the malpractice, which is a requirement for
full recovery."73 Courts that have allowed full recovery thus have
failed to distinguish the tort injury from the underlying injury and
have failed to apply the traditional test for causation74 to the re
quested relief.
The failure of proportional valuation to value accurately the lost
chance tort injury is less obvious. Indeed, courts advocating pro
portional valuation have claimed that proportional valuation "ap
portions damages in direct relation to the harm caused . . . [by]
neither over compensat[ing] plaintiffs or unfairly burden[ing] de
fendants with unattributable fault."75 Proponents of proportional
valuation are certainly correct in asserting the superiority of the ap
proach over alternatives that would compensate for the full value of
70. See

Vidmar & Rice, supra note 69, at 900-01.

71. See Kevin Joseph Willging, Case Note, Falcon v. Memorial Hospital: A Rational Ap
proach to Loss-of-Chance Tort Actions, 9 J. CoNTEMP. HEALTII L. & PoLY. 545, 553 (1993)
(noting that courts presented with lost chance cases sometimes "fail[ ] to properly identify
the injury sustained and have resorted to the practice of lowering the standard of proof re
quired to prevail").
72. Boody v. United States, 706 F. Supp. 1458, 1465 (D. Kan. 1989).
73. Smith v. State Dept. of Health & Hosps., 676 So. 2d 543, 547

(La. 1996).

74. Under the traditional test, "[a]n act or an omission is not regarded as a cause of an
event if the particular event would have occurred without it." KEETON ET AL., supra note 1,
§ 41, at 265. The loss of chance doctrine applies only to cases in which the preexisting condi
tion, more likely than the defendant's negligence, caused the ultimate harm.
7�. Boody, 706 F. Supp. at 1466. But see infra section II.B.3 (arguing that the propor
tional valuation metJiod loses much of its precision through problems of misapplication).
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the underlying injury or that would deny recovery altogether. But
arguments in favor of proportional valuation woefully lack an ade
quate justification for the position that it accurately compensates
the losses arising from a tort injury. Courts adopting proportional
valuation have failed to demonstrate why the value of the plaintiff's
lost chance of recovery is necessarily equal to some specific per
centage of the value of the decedent's life.
One would expect that the value of the lost chance to the de
fendant would depend at least somewhat on case-specific factors for
which the proportional valuation calculation does not account. Pro
portional valuation looks only to the reduced probability of avoid
ing injury and the value of the plaintiff's total injury.16 For
example, the proportional valuation method values a loss of a ten
percent chance of recovery equally, regardless of whether the loss
of chance reduces the plaintiff's overall chance of recovery from
forty percent to thirty percent or from ten percent to zero. The
point is not that the plaintiff must value the reduction from forty
percent to thirty percent differently from the reduction from ten
percent to zero, but that the proportional valuation method simply
assumes the victim attaches equal value to any ten-percent reduc
tion in her chance of recovery - and therefore denies the possibil
ity that the plaintiff does not equate the two reductions.
Furthermore, distinct elements of the tort injury differ funda
mentally from the traditional wrongful-death injury upon which the
proportional valuation method is based.77 Consider, for example,
emotional distress damages. Both a plaintiff's knowledge that she
likely will die from her cancer and her knowledge that her doctor's
negligent failure to diagnose the cancer has deprived her of a
chance to survive almost certainly cause the plaintiff considerable
emotional distress. If the plaintiff cannot show that the doctor's
misdiagnosis, rather than the preexisting cancer, caused her failure
to recover, then the doctor's liability should be limited to the emo
tional distress that arose out of the misdiagnosis. But instead of
focusing on that emotional distress, proportional valuation values
the plaintiff's emotional distress by multiplying the lost chance of
survival by the value of the plaintiff's overall emotional distress

76. These factors might fit well within a system that proportionally allocates damages to
the multiple potential causes of the plaintiff's underlying injury. Such a system, however, has
never been recognized as the basis for allowing a loss of chance claim. Rather, damages
awarded under the loss of chance doctrine should reflect the value of the physical, emotional,
and consequential losses that the defendant's delayed diagnosis caused. See supra section

I.B.
77. Cf. Smith, 616 So. 2d at 548 ("The lost chance of survival in professional malpractice

has a value in and of itself that is different from the value of a wrongful death or
survival claim.").

cases
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arising out of her preexisting condition and her lost chance of
survival.
Similarly, medical expenses in a lost chance case should not be
awarded based on a percentage of the medical expenses incurred in
treating the plaintiff's preexisting condition. Instead, the principle
of proximate causation requires that courts should award prevailing
lost chance plaintiffs the value of any additional medical expenses
incurred as a result of the defendant's negligence. If the defend
ant's negligence necessitated additional medical treatment,78 then
the defendant should be liable for the expenses associated with that
treatment. But these expenses do not automatically equal the value
calculated by multiplying the lost chance of recovering by the plain
tiff's total medical expenses.19
In sum, the discretionary valuation approach exhibits a closer
conceptual nexus to the compensable tort injury in a lost chance
case than do either the full damages approach or the proportional
valuation approach.
B.

Implementation Issues

The methods of calculating damages in lost chance cases differ
markedly in how they are implemented, both in terms of their allo
cation of responsibility between judge and factfinder and in their
amenability to application in a manner consistent with their concep
tual framework. This section argues that, in addition to the concep
tual advantages of discretionary valuation discussed in section II.A,
discretionary valuation reflects a more appropriate balance of
responsibilities between the judge and factfinder than does propor
tional valuation and is less susceptible to problems of mis
application. Section II.B.1 asserts that discretionary valuation
appropriately treats the lost chance damages calculation as an issue
of fact and that proportional valuation infringes on the traditional
domain of the factfinder by imposing a fixed damages calculation.
Section II.B.2 examines the amount of guidance provided to the
factfinder under discretionary valuation and concludes that, despite
the claims of its critics, discretionary valuation provides adequate
constraints on the factfinder's discretion. Section II.B.3 contends
78. For example, delayed diagnosis of a patient's cancer may require doctors to attempt
surgical removal of a tumor rather than chemotherapy treatment.
79. The additional medical expenses caused by the defendant's negligence may be greater
or less than the value calculated from the percentage chance lost and the total medical ex
penses. As is the case with any of the potential components of tort injury, see supra section
I.B (describing such components), the defendant's liability should extend only to cover those
medical expenses that the plaintiff can prove resulted from the defendant's negligence; if the
plaintiff cannot convince the factfinder that the defendant's negligence more likely than not
caused an element of damages, then the plaintiff should not recover for those damages.
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that courts are unable to implement proportional valuation without
sacrificing its conceptual precepts.
1.

Consistency with Traditional Damages Valuation

Of the methods of calculating damages in lost chance cases, the
discretionary method best comports with traditional methods of de
termining damages. The discretionary method properly recognizes
that the assessment of damages in a tort case is, at its core, a factual
issue properly left to the jury. Damages in lost chance cases are
incapable of - and inappropriate for - resolution by a fixed legal
principle other than the traditional requirement of causation.
Determining compensation involves four types of decisions: (a)
"fact:finding about the plaintiff's loss"; (b) "inferences or predic
tions based on the established facts"; (c) "translat[ion of] the plain
tiff's injury into a dollar amount when that injury is not readily
measured in monetary terms"; and ( d), "application of a legal
rule."80 The first three categories of decisions primarily involve de
termining issues of fact and thus fall within the province of the
jury.s1 Case law firmly establishes this conclusion,82 which finds ad
ditional support in historical, constitutional, and functional consid
erations.83 In particular, " [t]he jury brings the common sense and
varied backgrounds of a group of individuals to thorny questions
like the value of a plaintiff's pain and suffering. "84 By contrast, with
respect to the fourth type of decision - application of a legal rule
- neither constitutional85 nor functional considerations86 support
jury involvement.
Applying this analytical framework to lost chance cases yields
the conclusion that courts should give juries the discretion to value
80. Colleen P. Murphy, Determining Compensation: The Tension Between Legislative
Power and Jury Authority, 74 TEXAS L. RE.v. 345, 357-58 (1995).
81. See id. at 359.
82. See, e.g., Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935) (holding that the Seventh

Amendment requires that "a jury properly determine . . . the extent of the injury by an
assessment of damages" because the assessment involves "questions of fact"); Kansas Mal
practice Victims Coalition v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251, 258 (Kan. 1988) ("The determination of
damages is an issue of fact. Therefore, it is the jury's responsibility to determine damages
It would be illogical for this court to find that a jury, empaneled because monetary damages
are sought, could not then fully determine the amount of damages suffered."); Etheridge v.
Med. Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525, 529 (Va. 1989) ("Without question, the jury's fact-finding
function extends to the assessment of damages.").
.

•

•

•

83. See Murphy, supra note 80, at 360-61 (reviewing the "historical pedigree" of, and
reasons for, juries determining questions of fact).
84.

Id. at 361-62.

85. See Colleen P. Murphy, Integrating the Constitutional Authority of Civil and Criminal
Juries, 61 GEO. WASH. L. RE.v. 723, 759-66 (1993) (asserting that Supreme Court doctrine
does not require that legal rules be applied by juries).
86. See id. at 736-39 (asserting that judges may be better able than juries to achieve con
sistency and impartiality in applying legal rules).
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the tort injury, as that calculation properly involves only the first
three types of decisions and does not admit of resolution by a strict
legal rule. Application of a legal rule in damages assessment is not
appropriate "where no precise rule of law fixes the recoverable
damages."87 The highly case-specific nature of the tort injury,88
however, prevents any rigidly defined principle, established ex ante
and prescribed in all cases, from accurately "fixing" a lost chance
plaintiff's losses. The discretionary method avoids the imposition of
a legal rule on what is a purely factual determination and thus al
lows for individualized damage determinations that accurately re
flect the loss that a particular lost chance plaintiff suffers. By
contrast, the proportional valuation method applies a fixed mathe
matical formula to all assessments of lost chance injuries, inappro
priately imposing a legal principle on a factual issue, and thus
encroaches upon the rightful domain of the jury.s9
The recent Louisiana Supreme Court case of Smith v. State
Department of Health and Hospitals,9° in which Louisiana adopted
the discretionary method of damages valuation, provides a persua
sive discussion of the merits of the discretionary method in this
respect:
The starting point of our analysis is to recognize that the loss of a less
than-even chance of survival is a distinct injury compensable as gen
eral damages which cannot be calculated with mathematical cer
tainty. . . . Rather, the jury in a loss of a chance of survival case merely
considers the same evidence considered by a jury in a survival and
wrongful death action, and the loss-of-chance jury then reaches its
general damages award for that loss on that evidence as well as other
relevant evidence in the record.91

As the Louisiana court noted, discretionary valuation ensures that
evaluations of loss of chance damages us� the same analysis, "based
on all the evidence in the record, as is done for any other item of
general damages."92 The discretionary method's flexibility thus al
lows the factfinder to focus on the task of assessing the loss suffered
by the plaintiff.
87.

Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 565 (1886).

88. See supra section I.B.
89. See supra note 82. Nothing in the discretionary method prevents a factfinder from
finding that the plaintiff's damages are equal to the product of the percentage lost chance and
the value of the underlying injury, but the discretionary method, unlike proportional valua
tion, does not mandate as a matter of law that the factfinder so find.
90. 676 So. 2d 543 (La. 1996).
91. 676 So. 2d at 548-49.
92. 676 So. 2d at 547; see also 616 So. 2d at 549 ("This is a valuation of the only damages
at issue - the lost chance - which is based on all of the relevant evidence in the record, as is
done for any other measurement of general damages.").
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Guidance to Factfinder

Critics of the discretionary method of damage valuation claim
that the method fails to provide "meaningful guidance" to the
factfinder,93 and most courts that have examined this approach
have rejected it on the grounds that its lack of specific guidance
impedes proper valuation of the plaintiff's injury.94 This argument
undervalues the method's ability to constrain the factfinder's discre
tion. Several factors limit the jury's discretion in assessing lost
chance damages under the discretionary method. The discretionary
method allows the jury "to consider an abundance of evidence and
factors, including evidence of percentages of chance of survival
along with evidence such as loss of support and loss of love and
affection, and any other evidence bearing on the value of the lost
chance,"95 but traditional safeguards protect against the possibility
that the jury will make a serious mistake in weighing this evidence.
Appellate courts can police for "speculative verdicts" by ensuring
that the record contains evidence that supports the jury's verdict.96
The discretionary method can offer proper guidance and avoid un
fettered discretion through careful consideration of the evidence
put before the jury, precisely worded instructions to the jury in
structing it to tailor recovery to the losses that the defendant's neg
ligence caused, and reevaluation of the evidentiary support for the
jury's verdict on appeal.97
93. See King, supra note 9, at 1381-82; see also Delaney v. Cade, 873 P.2d 175, 187 {Kan.
1994) (criticizing the discretionary valuation approach as lacking precision); Reisig, supra
note 10, at 1184 (same).
94. See, e.g., Boody v. United States, 706 F. Supp. 1458, 1465 (D. Kan. 1989); Delaney,
873 P.2d at 187. In Boody, the court criticized the discretionary valuation method: "While
simple in formulation and fully allowing a decision maker to render justice, this rule is
flawed. The decision maker needs some circumscription to properly evaluate the compensa
tion necessary for the loss of a fractional right. The damages inquiry, when possible, should
be more precise." Boody, 106 F. Supp. at 1465. In Delaney, the Kansas Supreme Court
criticized the discretionary valuation method in similar terms:
Under this method; the court or jury is left without instruction or guidance in ascertain
ing the appropriate damage figure. Instead, the trier of fact is permitted to use its expe
rience, judgment, and common sense in determining the appropriate value for the lost
chance. Although this method is the simplest because the introduction of statistical evi
dence is unnecessary, the goal of reaching some degree of precision in determining the
loss allocation is lacking.
Delaney, 873 P.2d at 187.

Smith, 676 So. 2d at 549.
See 676 So. 2d at 549.
97. The case of James v. United States, 483

95.
96.

F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Cal. 1980), provides an
excellent example of how the discretionary method can appropriately constrain the
factfinder's judgment by focusing on determining the losses caused by the defendant's negli
gence. After identifying the physical and emotional losses that constituted James's tort in
jury, the James court examined each type of damages claimed by James to determine if they
had been caused by the hospital's negligence. The court held that James was not entitled to
recover lost e�gs arising from the period of treatment for and recovery from his lung
cancer, because "the proof is not sufficient to find that the government's negligence was a
proximate cause (i.e., a substantial factor) in bringing about the condition which
required
.

•

•
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Moreover, despite the contrary claims of Professor King and
others, the discretionary method is no less precise than proportional
valuation; both methods substantially rely on subjective assess
ments of the plaintiff's losses.98 The proportional valuation method
as practiced by courts differs greatly from the precise analytical tool
portrayed by the method's proponents.99 Proportional valuation
does not avoid subjective assessments by the fact:finder but merely
hides its subjectivity behind the veil of its "precise" mathematical
formula.100 Because proportional valuation depends entirely on the
factfinder's subjective assessment of the value of the plaintiff's un
derlying injury, the discretionary method is no less subjective or less
precise than proportional valuation. Use of an objectively con
structed formula comprised ' of subjectively determined variables
and coefficients "does not magically make [proportional valuation]
more precise or more accurate than simply allowing the fact:finder
to value directly the loss of a chance of survival that is the sole item
of damages at issue in the case. "101
The discretionary method, far from relying on unconstrained
subjective assessments, guides the fact:finder toward a more accu
rate analysis by focusing the inquiry on the ultimate objective of
[James] to stop work." 483 F. Supp. at 588. The court found that James's wife was not enti
tled to compensation for loss of support, as "[p]laintiffs have failed to prove that defendant's
negligence was the proximate cause of a measurable reduction in James's working life expec
tancy." 483 F. Supp. at 588. Fmally, the court found that James's wife was not entitled to
compensation for loss of consortium, because the plaintiffs had not proven a "complete loss
of consortium for a definite period of time." 483 F. Supp. at 588. The court went on to note
that "[i]n this case, moreover, the existence of the terminal illness appears to be the dominant
cause of the impairment of the marital relationship, the impact of the government's negli
gence being relatively insignificant." 483 F. Supp. at 588.

98. The two approaches differ, of course, in that proportional valuation hides the
factfinder's subjective valuation of the plaintiff's losses behind the veil of a fixed - and, this
Note argues, overly rigid - formula for translating the factfinder's subjective assessments
into the plaintiff's damages award.
99. See infra section Il.B.3.
100. As one federal district court deciding between the discretionary method and propor-

tional valuation observed:

[w]hichever method is used, the decisionmaker must make a highly subjective decision.
In the [discretionary valuation] method . . . the decisionmaker must make the subjective
decision of what amount of money would fully compensate the plaintiff for her injuries.
The [proportional valuation] approach requires the decisionmaker to make the subjec
tive decision of allotting a monetary amount for the value of plaintiff's life. . . . ['The
proportional valuation] approach basically involves a subjective judgment being mathe
matically discounted. We are unconvinced that the mathematical discounting of the sub
jective value of human life somehow makes that approach any more precise and more
accurate than the approach we have chosen.
Borgren v. United States, 723 F. Supp. 581, 583 (D. Kan. 1989); see also KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 1, § 127, at 953 {observing that the process of damages determination in a wrong
ful death case "necessarily involves a large element of speculation, turning on such matters as
life expectancy, income, habits and health of the deceased, past contributions to his family,
the probability of increased earnings and contributions in the future, and, in some jurisdic
tions, the probability of future inflation").

101. Smith, 676 So. 2d at 548.
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damages assessment - compensating the losses caused by the de
fendant's negligence - rather than offering a rigid mathematical
formula.
3.

Mathematical Formalism, Oversimplification, and Other
Problems of Misapplication

This section argues that proportional valuation is inherently
prone to misapplication in ways that discretionary valuation is not.
Although commentators and courts sing its praises over discretion
ary valuation,102 the proportional valuation method is alternatively
a crude measure of the loss suffered in a lost chance case or too
complex for practical application.
Perhaps the most compelling argument against the proportional
valuation method comes from the cases that have attempted to ap
ply the method. Courts applying pr.oportional valuation routinely
apply it to all of the losses suffered by the plaintiff; no damages are
calculated outside of that method.103 Yet clearly some of the conse
quences of the tort injury - for example, increased pain and suffer
ing - are �ntirely the result of the defendant's negligence and
should not be discounted by the proportional valuation calculation.
Put simply, the proportional valuation method errs fundamentally
in "its rigid use of a precise mathematical formula, based on impre
cise percentage chance estimates applied to estimates of general
damages that never occurred, to arrive at a figure for an item of
general damages that this court has long recognized cannot be cal
culated with mathematical precision."104
Furthermore, courts applying proportional valuation virtually
exclusively have used what Professor King refers to as "the single
outcome method," whereby the court values the tort injury based
on the lost chance of complete recovery.105 Any medical malprac
tjce case involves multiple possible outcomes, however, ranging
102. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 94; King supra note 9, at 1381-82; Reisig, supra note
10, at 1183.
103. See, e.g., Falcon v. Memorial Hosp., 462 N.W.2d 44, 57 (Mich. 1990); Perez v. Las
Vegas Med. Ctr., 805 P.2d 589, 592 (Nev. 1991).
104. Smith, 616 So. 2d at 548. The Louisiana court's statement calls to mind the criticism
that co=entators have leveled at another damages calculation method that similarly relies
heavily on mathematical calculation - the "per diem" method of calculating pain-and·suffer
ing damages. See Geistfeld, supra note 59, at 782. Juries in jurisdictions that use the per
diem method are asked to determine the value of one day of pain and suffering by the plain
tiff, and then multiply that value by the length of time that the plaintiff has experienced or
will experience such pain and suffering. See id. A number of courts and co=entators have
criticized the method, noting that "by lending a quantitative component to the damages cal
culation, it 'lend[s) a false air of certainty to an area where none exists.' " Id. (quoting James
0. Pearson, Jr., Annotation, Per Diem or Similar Mathematical Basis for Fixing Damages for
Pain and Suffering, 3 A.L.R.4TH 940, 945 (1981)).
105. See King, supra note 9, at 1384.
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from complete recovery to death.106 Thus, to reflect these multiple
potential outcomes effectively in a proportional valuation calcula
tion, the factfinder must identify each possible outcome and the
probability of occurrence associated with each, a process that Pro
fessor King labels an "expected value" or "weighted mean" calcula
tion.101 Single-outcome proportional valuation obscures this factual
J
complexity and thus significantly undercuts the precision so lauded
by proportional valuation's proponents.
On the other hand, as King admits, the complexity of the
expected-value calculation is potentially staggering, as it "could in
volve a virtually unlimited number of permutations that would have
to be weighted before they could be aggregated to arrive at the
value of the chance. " 10s The fact that courts adopting proportional
valuation overwhelmingly have utilized the single-outcome ap
proach would appear to indicate either that they perceive the com
plexity of the expected-outcome approach as overwhelming or that
they fail to understand the full complexity of the tort injury.
One might argue that courts' frequent misapplication of propor
tional valuation does not limit its theoretical advantages over other
methods.109 The costs of abusing a technique, however, must be
reckoned among the costs of using it at all to the extent that the
latter creates risks of the former. As noted by Professor Tribe,
in at least some contexts, permitting any use of certain mathematical
methods entails a sufficiently high risk of misuse, or a risk of misuse
sufficiently costly to avoid, that it would be irrational not to take such
misuse into account when deciding whether to permit the methods to
be employed at all.110

106. Tue timing of the onset of these outcomes may also be uncertain. For example, King
offers the example of a situation in which "as a result of [an] accident there is a 25% chance
of the onset of injury-induced blindness occurring at fifty years of age, a 4% chance at forty, a
1 % chance at thirty, and a 70% chance that such blindness would never result" Id. Thus, a
truly accurate proportional valuation calculation must take into account not only the possibil
ity of outcomes other than death or full recovery but also the temporal dispersion of each of
these outcomes. See id.
107. See id. Professor King actually understates the complexity of a truly sophisticated
weighted-mean calculation, in that his discussion notes only the multiple possible outcomes
and their corresponding probabilities of occurrence after the defendant's negligence has
taken place. King fails to recognize that in order to isolate the effects of the defendant's
negligence, a weighted-mean calculation also must consider the multiple outcomes and corre
sponding probabilities that the preexisting condition would have caused in the absence of the
defendant's negligence. A sophisticated proportional valuation calculation would require the
factfinder to determine the change in the probability caused by the defendant's negligence
for each outcome, multiply this number by the value of the total loss associated with each
outcome, and then sum these values over all the potential outcomes.
108. Id.
109. But see supra sections II.A & II.B (arguing that these theoretical advantages do not
exist).
110. Laurence H. 'fribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process,
84 HAR.v. L. REv. 1329, 1331 (1971).
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Aside from the fact that mathematical formulae do not enable
courts to calculate accurately the value of a tort injury, the propor
tional valuation method also is plagued by its reduction of the tradi
tionally subjective valuation process to a rigid mathematical
calculation. The use of mathematical formulae or schedules for
computing damages in tort cases has long been rejected by
courts.111 As Professor Tribe has noted,
although the mathematical or pseudo-mathematical devices which a
society embraces to rationalize its systems for adjudication may be
quite comprehensible to a student of that society's customs and cul
ture, those devices may nonetheless operate to distort - and, in some
instances, to destroy - important values which that society means to
express or to pursue through' the conduct of legal tria1s.112

By imposing a one-size-fits-all formula on every lost chance case to
which it is applied, proportional valuation deprives the factfinder of
the flexibility to weigh the impact of the tort injury on the individ
ual plaintiff. Thus, application of proportional valuation inevitably
results in a quagmire of practical problems.
The discretionary valuation method is superior - both in
theory and in practice - to the proportional valuation and full
damages methods. The discretionary method is not without its limi
tations; the method depends on careful guidance by courts and
thoughtful implementation by factfinders. But its advantages over
the proportional valuation and full damages method are clear. The
lack of nexus between the damages calculation of the full damages
method and the value of the lost chance tort injury exposes that
method's gross inadequacy. The proportional valuation method
suffers from two fundamental flaws. First, the method lacks accu
racy; damages assessed by the method lack a clear nexus to the
plaintiff's losses. Second, the method lacks precision; in practice,
courts purporting to adopt proportional valuation apply a crude ap
proximation of Professor King's theory. Moreover, increasing the
method's precision to a suitable level would cause it to become so
administratively cumbersome as to be unworkable. The short
comings of proportional valuation - both as conceived and as ap
plied - render the method's result a crude measure of the actual
harm suffered, preventing the proportional valuation method from
fulfilling the expectations of its advocates and highlighting the need
for discretionary valuation's more flexible approach to damages
valuation in lost chance cases. Only discretionary valuation allows
the factfinder to tailor the plaintiff's recovery to the compensable
harm suffered in a particular case.
111. See, e.g., Geistfeld, supra note 59, at 810-11 (noting "[j]udicial resistance to the use
of [mathematical] formulas" in valuing pain-and-suffering damages).
112. Tribe, supra note 110, at 1330.
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CONCLUSION
Courts and commentators have debated vigorously the advan
tages and disadvantages of allowing recovery for a lost chance of
survival. Ultimately, the worth of the lost chance doctrine should
be determined by evaluating its ability to accomplish the tort objec
tives of deterrence, compensation, and corrective justice in the
unique context of the lost chance factual scenario. The chaotic
state of the doctrine currently limits the ability of the doctrine to
address these needs effectively. Courts faced with lost chance cases
reflect this confusion with inconsistent and ill-reasoned applications
of the doctrine.
Much of this confusion could be alleviated by a clear and careful
analysis of the tort injury, an analysis that focuses on making a case
specific, fact-intensive determination of the losses suffered by the
plaintiff as a result of the defendant's negligence. In particular,
courts must clearly distinguish the tort injury from the losses associ
ated with the plaintiff' s underlying injury. Courts valuing damages
in lost chance cases should adopt the discretionary method of valua
tion, which allows the fact:finder the flexibility to evaluate the plain
tiff' s losses by assessing all of the available evidence.

